Defending the Defenceless: Speciesism, Animal Liberation, and Consistency in Applied Ethics
An Animal Rights Article from AllCreatures.org

FROM

Lisa Kemmerer
March 2015

“Defending the Defenseless: Speciesism, Animal Liberation, and Consistency in Applied Ethics” first appeared in Les Ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum, March 2015

Indeed, these animal liberationists are living up to well established, widely held moral principles, and instead of denigrating these determined moral exemplars—that is, wilfully mislabelling them as terrorists—we ought to praise such bold willingness to defend the defenceless and the innocent from such violent, powerful aggressors.

Abstract

This article explores whether or not animal activists who engage in violence might legitimately be labelled “terrorists.” To this end, I examine common assumptions concerning the use of preemptive counterviolence in order to defend the comparatively defenceless. Through the use of casuistry, this essay compares specific hypothetical instances of killing comparatively defenceless individuals, beginning with scenarios that offer a clear general consensus, moving to more controversial cases. This indicates that contemporary violence on behalf of animal liberation, often assumed to be rash and radical, is actually quite restrained. The intent of this paper is not to make claims as to how liberationists ought to behave, but rather to highlight egregious inconsistencies in our attitudes to ward violence on behalf of those who are comparatively defenceless.

Arguments in this essay, above all else, are rooted in consistency, and my task is to assess what consistency requires if we hold a particular point of view concerning the use of violence on behalf of the defenceless. I begin by calling attention to what appears to be a broadly held moral outlook, with regard to the use of violence on behalf of comparatively defenceless human beings. I then apply this common moral outlook to a second scenario that is similar in morally relevant ways, allowing con sistency to lead the way.

Clarifications

I use the term “comparatively defenceless” for clarity. For example For exam ple, toddlers are not completely defenceless, but they are certainly compara tively defenceless. Toddlers are also widely considered “innocent,” though it is easy to argue about particulars—innocent of what? Young humans are masters of manipulation, for example, and are often cruel to beings who are yet more vul nerable, such as insects, very patient pets, or smaller children. Where “innocent” is used in this essay, it does not mean “innocent of all wrongs, or completely without blame,” but rather “innocent of any crime or action that most people would consider it reasonable to punish with longterm imprisonment or death.” From here forward, for the sake of simplicity, I sometimes drop “comparatively” before “innocent” and “defenseless,” but “comparatively” is implied in each instance.  

With regard to the aggressors presented in the following scenarios, they are not under duress or otherwise acting for the sake of selfpreservation. (Interestingly, even if the posed aggressors were acting for selfpreservation, the general moral sense established in the above scenario would not necessarily support aggressive actions. My experience is that student responses are mixed in such a situation.)

I begin by establishing what appears to be a broadly held moral outlook with regard to the use of violence on behalf of the comparatively defenceless. Toward this end, I posit two scenarios:

  • Scenario 1: Gunman, Toddlers, and PreEmptive CounterViolence
  • Scenario 2: Gunman, Whales, and PreEmptive CounterViolence

Read entire article here (PDF)

Conclusion

Broad moral consensus appears to hold that preemptive counterviolence is ap propriate, even praiseworthy, when used on behalf of comparatively defence less, innocent individuals faced with a direct and immediate threat. Timehonoured, foundational philosophical tools such as casuistry, consistency, impartiality, and the application of logic and reason, lead us to the following line of reasoning:

  • Given that people support—even praise—preemptive counter violence on behalf of defenceless, innocent human animals,
  • and given an absence of any morally relevant distinction be tween human beings as a whole and all other animals,
  • we ought to support—even praise—preemptive countervio lence on behalf of other defenceless, innocent animals.

If this reasoning is correct, we are obliged to praise preemptive countervio lence on behalf of defenceless, innocent individuals—whether chickens sent to slaughter, fish pulled from the sea, rabbits trapped in animal labs, or bobcats trapped or electrocuted for their fur. Furthermore, to fail to support such pre emptive counterviolence is speciesist, inconsistent, and is therefore morally unintelligible

Those unwilling to accept this conclusion will need to:

  • establish a morally relevant distinction between all humans and all other animals, or
  •  reject the use of violence on behalf of the defenceless and innocent, whether toddlers or turkeys.

In the absence of such a shift, animal activists ought to be praised as heroes for using preemptive counterviolence on behalf of nonhuman animals who are threatened by human beings.

Perhaps most importantly, animal activists who destroy labs or slaughterhouses, release exploited and imprisoned mice or mink, or sabotage shoots or hunts can not reasonably be labelled “terrorists.” Indeed, these animal liberationists are living up to wellestablished, widely held moral principles, and instead of denigrating these determined moral exemplars—that is, wilfully mislabelling them as terrorists—we ought to praise such bold willingness to defend the defenceless and the innocent from such violent, powerful aggressors.

Lisa holds a B.A. in international studies, Reed College; M.T.S. in comparative religions, Harvard University School; Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Glasgow, Scotland. She is a philosopheractivist, artist, and lover of wild places, who has hiked, biked, kayaked, backpacked, and traveled widely. She is the author and editor of several books, and is currently associate professor of philosophy and religion at Montana State University, Billings.  

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