The interest of animals in not suffering explains that the physical pain that nonhuman animals can experience is as significant to them as the pain we experience as humans is to us. It is the same with positive experiences.
Blue Turtle on sand
Why nonhuman animals have an interest in life
It is sometimes claimed that although sentient nonhuman animals have
an interest in not suffering, they do not have an interest in
living. But the fact is that many nonhuman animals can have positive
and negative experiences. The positive experiences nonhuman animals
can have can be of different sorts. In some cases they are simple
physical enjoyments, while in other cases they have to do with
emotions and pleasant thoughts, which many nonhuman animals are
capable of having. Animals who play and social animals who enjoy
relating to each other have such experiences. The interest of
animals in not suffering explains that the physical pain that
nonhuman animals can experience is as significant to them as the
pain we experience as humans is to us. It is the same with positive
experiences.
However, if nonhuman animals die, they can no longer have any
positive experiences. When someone dies, they can no longer enjoy
all the good things that they could experience if they were to
remain alive. Thus all sentient animals can be harmed by death, and
actually are so harmed when they die. So sentient animals not only
have an interest in not suffering, but also have an interest in
remaining alive.
Unfortunately, this doesn’t mean that the lives of nonhuman animals
usually consist of mainly positive experiences. The suffering that
animals experience, in most cases, is more prevalent than any
well-being they have. This is true of both exploited animals and
animals in the wild. Nonhuman animals often die when they are very
young. Although it could be thought that dying young would be a
relief, because they no longer suffer, we must also take into
account the fact that dying so young eliminates the possibility that
they might have had positive experiences that could counterbalance
their negative experiences.
We clearly recognize that death is harmful in the case of human
beings for reasons such as the ones presented above. If we consider
the
arguments against speciesism, we are presented with the question
of how these reasons are to be considered when the interest in
positive experiences of other animals is at stake.
There are several objections that have been presented against the
argument that nonhuman animals are harmed by death. Those who make
such objections conclude that the death of nonhuman animals is
objectionable only in a limited way, if at all. Such views would not
necessarily justify a lack of concern for the interests of nonhuman
animals while they are alive. What they would lead to, though, is
the conviction that nonhuman animals don’t have a significant
interest in living, so killing them painlessly wouldn’t be a
problem. However, there are good reasons to reject these objections.
Both the specific objections and responses that can be given to them
are presented below.
Are only those who have a desire to live harmed by death?
One way to defend the claim that only humans have an interest in
living is to argue that only they can understand the fact that they
are alive and, therefore, that only humans can desire to be alive.
According to this perspective, the only individuals with an interest
in living would be those who have a desire to remain alive.1
According to this argument, nonhuman animals cannot have an interest
in living. This claim has two important consequences. First, it
means that we have no reason not to kill nonhuman animals. Second,
it means that if we are in a situation in which we could save their
lives, we have no reason to do so, except to save them from the pain
or terror of death.
However, this argument about the desire to remain alive doesn’t
work. It could be noted, first, that there are many nonhuman animals
who do understand the fact that they are alive and who do fight hard
for their lives. Nonetheless, this is beside the point because the
ability to experience life does not depend on a having a desire to
remain alive, but it does depend on remaining alive.
The idea underlying the argument that having an interest in living
requires having the desire to remain alive comes from the claim that
what is valuable for us is not that we have positive or negative
experiences, but, rather, that we can satisfy our preferences.
According to preference satisfaction views, what matters is that we
get what we want rather than what will be positive for us. However,
the key issue here is that if one dies, one cannot satisfy any
preferences at all. We have seen that we have reasons to conclude
that all beings who can have positive experiences have an interest
in not having those positive experiences taken away from them. It’s
the same if instead of talking about positive experiences we
consider preference satisfaction. Even if one’s preferences are not
about being alive, but about something else, one cannot satisfy any
preferences if one dies.
Moreover, we can also reject this entire viewpoint altogether and
assume that satisfying preferences is not what matters, but that
having positive and not negative experiences is what matters. In
fact, it is evident that having a negative experience such as
suffering pain is bad. This is so apparent that those who claim that
preferences are what matters claim that whenever we suffer a pain,
we just develop a preference against it. This implies that all the
beings who can feel suffering and joy are capable of having
preferences that can be satisfied or frustrated. Therefore, this
argument fails to show that nonhuman animals don’t have an interest
in living because, as stated above, the ability to experience
suffering and joy does not depend on having a desire (or preference)
to stay alive, but it does depend on staying alive.
Are only those who have complex interests harmed by death?
It has also been argued that nonhuman animals do not have an
interest in living because only those who have complex interests can
have a relevant interest in living.2 There are two ways this claim
can be defended: (1) By arguing that satisfying a simple interest,
such as enjoying a certain pleasure, is something trivial and
unimportant, which wouldn’t be enough to imply an interest in
living. (2) By arguing that satisfying a simple interest is not
something that requires continuing to live, because being alive is
only necessary to satisfy complex interests such as those having to
do with life plans and the achievement of long term goals.
Regarding the first claim, it is true that those complex interests
may be more significant than simple interests, because their
satisfaction would be better for those who have them than the
satisfaction of other, simpler interests. But this is not
necessarily so. Complexity is something different from intensity. We
can have a very basic interest that is very simple, but which it is
far more important for us to satisfy than more complex interests.
For example, an interest in eating is simpler than an interest in
enjoying a piece of fine art, but eating is the more important
interest. Someone who had to choose between doing without the
contemplation of fine art and starvation would be making a bad
choice if they decided to starve. So even if humans have more
complex interests, this doesn’t mean that those interests are
necessarily more important to them than simpler ones.
Regarding the second claim, we must note that death deprives
sentient beings of the possibility of having any experience. This
includes the possibility of fulfilling long term plans, but it also
includes other things such as enjoyments one does not need to plan
in advance. Therefore, death also harms those who do not have the
capacity to make long term plans.
Are only those who have a sense of themselves through time harmed by
death?
Finally, another argument claims that only those who can see
themselves as beings who persist through time, and thus can make
plans for the future, can have an interest in living.3 This argument
is stronger than the others we have seen, since it is at least
plausible that if one has an interest in living then it is because
one can make use of the fact that one will go on existing in the
future, rather than merely in the present. This argument relies on
the idea that to make use of the fact that one not only exists in
the present, but will also exist in the future, one has to see
oneself in the future, too. However, this argument can also be
refuted. Even if one isn’t able to see oneself in the future, if one
could continue existing into the future, then one would be harmed by
not being allowed to go on living, since depriving someone of life
deprives them of having their own experiences.
All the reasons discussed above show that any being who has the
capacity to have positive experiences is harmed by death. This means
that all sentient animals are harmed by death.
Further readings
Notes